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Me In the PhenomejrcolpgY of Perception, Maurice rleau-Ponty criticizes ""the "prejudice toward the ob-
jective world" 1 which, he says, contaminates philoso-
phy. Under the influence of this prejudice, philo-
sophers have used "objective data"--data which does not 
come from perception but from other sources such as 
science--to study perception, instead of using the ac-
tual subjective data of perception. The result has 
been a history of inaccurate theories of perception and 
knowledge. One expression of Merleau-Ponty's critique 
of this prejudice is his thesis of the ambiguity of 
time, which he approaches through a discussion of the 
constitution of the body as an object. Although 
Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly say so, a close exam-
ination of this thesis reveals that object-oriented ap-
praches to philosophy do not take into account the am-
biguity of time. 
The four sections of this paper lead from a 
description of Merleau-Ponty's ideas about time and the 
self to their implications for the general structure of 
philosophical explanation. Part I describes Merleau-
Ponty' s discussion of the objective and subjective 
faces of experience of the body, understood through the 
ambiguity of time. Two major themes or theses are 
identified: (1) an understanding of the constitution 
of the body as object will contribute to an understand-
ing of the constitution of the world as object, and (2) 
the ambiguity of time characterizes all being-in-the-
world. Part II investigates the roots of Merleau-
Ponty' s two major theses in the work of Husserl, and 
notes where Merleau-Ponty agrees or disagrees. Part 
III provides an example of the interweaving of the two 
theses by interpreting the work of David Hume along 
Merleau-Ponty's lines. Part IV provides a critique of 
the types of explanations offered by Hume and Husserl, 
as based on an inadequate understanding of the ambi-
guity of time. 
Three limitations of the paper must be noted. 
First, the ideas are not yet informed by their integra-
tion into the lived experience of the author. Second, 
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the discussion of time in this paper focuses on the 
relationship of past and present. It does not take 
adequate concern with the role of the future in the am-
biguity of time, and, therefore, with the role of the 
future aspect in the constitution of the self or in 
philosophical explanation. The justification for it is 
Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the interaction of past and 
present. Third, although the paper discusses Merleau-
Ponty' s criticism of object-oriented explanation in 
philosophy, it does not adequately articulate the new 
form of explanation which emerges from that criticism. 
I 
In Phenomeno1ogy of Perception Merleau-Ponty 
rejects the doctrines of physiological psychology which 
describe perception in terms of the organs of sensation 
by defining "the visible (as) what is seized upon with 
the eyes; the sensible |as| what is seized upon by the 
senses. M 1 Scientists who believe this usually estab-
lish a point by point correspondence and constant con-
nection between the stimulus and elementary perception. 
If perception -were correctly defined as what one per-
ceives through the senses, people with injured sensory 
systems would not perceive objects as healthy people 
do. Yet medical research shows that injured sensory 
systems do keep sensation constant, in accordance with 
a basic pattern of perceptual experience. For Merleau-
Ponty, this pattern points to what emerges as objective 
rather than subjective in human experience. He in-
vestigates the basic pattern through which people per-
ceive their bodies, since the body is the vehicle with 
which we navigate the world. If we understand the con-
stitution of the body as object, we will understand 
some aspects of the constitution of the world as ob-
ject. 
Merleau-Ponty chooses to discuss and redefine the 
problem posed by the phenomena of phantom limb (the il-
lusion that an amputated limb still exists) and anogno-
sia (refusal by a paralyzed patient to acknowledge the 
paralysis). If a person conceives of the world in 
terms of the possible interactions his/her body can 
have with it, or as a series of actions s/he can per-
form upon it, the person with phantom limb or anognosia 
experiences the world through his/her former body. The 
paralyzed person still perceives and attempts to use 
the floor as something s/he can walk on; the amputee 
feels the cold night air as something that causes mus-
cular cramps. Objects which were formerly one side of 
an interaction take on a character of their own. The 
subjectively experienced becomes an object, standing 
alone, independently of a person's perception or inter-
action with it. In the cases of phantom limb and anog-
nosia, this is made possible*by a body that gets stuck 
at a certain stage of experience, at a certain point in 
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time. The body is no longer the body of a particular 
person, no longer a personal body. It has become im-
personal, an objective, generalized body. 
Merleau-Ponty seems to suggest that all of us, 
healthy or unhealthy, from time to time experience an 
impersonal body as well as our personal body, and that 
this objective, physiological body appears as a neces-
sary condition for us to have any personal experience. 
We believe that if we had no objective body, no sensory 
organs, no central nervous system, we woud experience 
nothing at all. Yet we learn about our sensory organs 
by perceiving with them; we learn about our central 
nervous system through a science which is presumably 
based on observable data. Merleau-Ponty states the 
problem succintly: 
This paradox is that of all being in the world: 
when 1 move towards a world I bury my perceptual 
and practical intentions in objects which ulti-
mately appear prior to and external to those in-
tentions, and which nevertheless exist for me 
only in so far as they arouse in me thoughts or 
volitions.' 
Rather than try to show that the paradox is only a con-
fusion and not a paradox, Merleau-Ponty accepts it as a 
tension between irreducibles and sets out to explain 
why they are irreducible to one another. 
Most of the time personal existence represses the 
organism without being able either to go beyond 
it or to renounce itself; without, in other 
words, being able either to reduce the organism 
to its existential self, or itself to the organ-
ism. * 
Merleau-Ponty describes the relationship between 
the personal body and the impersonal body as one of 
"repression," a term he borrows from psychoanalysis. 
Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary defines repres-
sion as a "refusal to entertain distressing or painful 
ideas . . These ideas take on the character of a 
complex, "a subconscious idea (or group of ideas) which 
has become associated with a repressed wish or emo-
tional experience and which may influence behavior al-
though the person may not have any appreciation of the 
conncection between the repressed thoughts or |sic) 
actions."' The Dictionary suggests that a complex may 
become the very framework through which a person per-
ceives the world. For example, a child who has grown 
up with an authoritative father may continue throughout 
her life to rebel against the suggestions of any older 
person in a position of authority. Emotional trauma 
has rendered an experience—in this case submission to 
author!ty--so painful that normal or healthy develop-
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ment in that area could not proceed. The woman's in-
teraction with authority figures is stuck at a particu-
lar stage in time. Despite each teacher or employer's 
individual character, what the woman puts into and 
receives from each relationship remains the same. 
Although the relationship is an interaction, her ex-
perience does not acknowledge that. 
A complex "may, (however) be harmless . . . i.e. an 
artist sees every object with a view to a possible pic-
ture and is said to have established a complex for 
art." 7 Most of the time the customary/impersonal body 
functions as such a harmless complex. It provides a 
background or a structure which gives shape to our 
(personal) bodily experiences, makes them take a cer-
tain form, helps us interpret them in a uniform way. 
The personal body provides the content for our experi-
ence; the customary body provides its boundaries. In 
the case of extreme trauma, such as paralysis or loss 
of limb, the real content of personal bodily experience 
is too painful to acknowledge and bodily experience 
gets stuck at an earlier stage. The repressed imper-
sonal body (in the form of past experience) takes over 
and provides the content of present experience. The 
relationship of repression is not an accidental meta-
phor but an inescapable shape taken by our experience 
of ourselves in time. 
The fusion of soul and body in the act, the sub-
limation of biological into personal existence, 
and of the natural into the cultural world is 
made both possible and precarious by the temporal 
structure of our experience.* 
In Merleau-Ponty's vision, the present has an imme-
diacy which the past lacks. The present is indubita-
ble, alive, happening before our very eyes. The past 
draws its life from the present in a twofold way. The 
present includes a past which is supposed to have hap-
pened before it. We have access to that past, and, in 
so far as it is related to present events and exper-
iences, we can reinterpret and reconstruct it. On the 
other hand, the past was once a present, and so it 
still carries that indubitable immediacy—it happened 
as it happened and that's that. The past draws its au-
thority from the fact that it was once a present, and 
its flexibility from the fact that it can be reinter-
preted in the light of present events. Without the 
present, the past is nothing. And yet there is no pre-
sent without a past presupposed, at least in the realm 
of ordinary human experience. Merleau-Ponty describes 
the impersonal/objective life as analogous to the past 
and the personal/cultural life as analogous to the 
present. Impersonal/objective life draws both its 
authority and its flexibility from personal/subjective 
life. Objective knowledge about the body and the world 
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of repression. Repression is made possible by the am-biguity of time. Because of tho amhir»,4*„ «r t - i ^ 
Husserl, the phenomenologist upon whose work 
-Ponty builds, accepting some ideas and reject-
In Ideas Husserl outlines a program for phenome-
nological investigation of philosophical questions. He 
introduces the main tool of phenomenology, the phenome-
nological reduction, and sketches out preliminary find-
ings on a variety of topics, including the nature of 
the self or ego. An investigator performs the phenome-
nological reduction by "putting into brackets," or set-
ting aside, the natural attitude in which we experience 
ourselves living in a real, concrete, existent world. 
The investigator focuses only on the data of conscious-
ness, putting aside all questions about the objective 
world. The reduction enables the investigator to dis-
cern exactly what in experience is given essentially by 
consciousness. According to the theory of intentional-
ity which underlies the reduction, consciousness con-
stitutes and picks out its objects from its stream of 
pure experience. Consciousness is able to do this 
without reference to existence or the external world. 
A thing existing in the external world is only recog-
nized as the fulfillment or verification of a com-
pletely constituted meaning/object or, as Husserl often 
calls it, "intentional unity." 
Merleau-Ponty does not accept the consequence of 
this theory, the closed consciousness. For Merleau-
Ponty, the subjective and the objective interact to 
constitute our experience of the world. Experience in-
volves a reference to things existing in the world. 
II 
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Therefore, he does not use Husserl's method of reduc-
tion, but adopts a milder method of bracketing objec-
tive knowledge, which allows him to apprehend and use 
the data of perception in its original form. 
Using the phenomenological reduction, Husserl dis-
covers two faces of the self. 
We have, then, to take our own case, on the one 
side the psychological point of view in which the 
glance is directed upon experience as the natural 
standpoint dictates, upon an experience of joy, 
for instance, as an inner state of feeling of a 
man or an animal. On the other side we have 
woven together with this, as an essential possi-
bility, the phenomenological point of view, ac-
cording to which, all transcendences having been 
disconnected, the glance is directed in reflec-
tion upon the absolute pure consciousness, giving 
us the apperception of an absolute experience in 
its intimate subjective flow . . .' 
The empirical ego represents our experience of the self 
in the natural attitude and the phenomenological ego 
represents the self in closed consciousness which we 
find after performing the reduction. The empirical ego 
is the fulfillment or manifestation of the phenome-
nological ego in the world. Consciousness manifests in 
the world in the form of a "state of consciousness." 
The essence or distinguishing characteristic of a state 
of consciousness is that it appears as a property of a 
body. A state of consciousness is what some body, 
human or animal, is thinking, feeling or experiencing 
at a particular point in time. Consciousness is able 
to participate in the external world by being linked to 
a body. However, this linkage is somehow accomplished 
within closed consciousness, for a state of conscious-
ness is an intentional unity constituted within the 
stream of pure experience. Merleau-Ponty seems to ac-
cept Husserl's idea that the body is the point at which 
consciousness enters the world. The empirical ego is 
the first or primary object in our experience by virtue 
of being our point of entry into the objective world. 
If we understand how the body manages the objective/-
subjective paradox, we can understand how the paradox 
functions in our experience of the world. 
Merleau-Ponty 1s ideas about the ambiguity of time 
are also derived from Husserl. Husserl accepts from 
Kant the idea that time is the form of, and a condition 
of, inner experience. But for Husserl, time is not 
simply a succession of representations. In "The 
Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness from the Year 
1905," he explains his view that a series of discrete 
present moments (which become a series of discrete past 
moments) is not sufficient to constitute experience as 
we know it. A complex object, such as a melody, could 
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hot be an object of experience if it were simply a suc-
cession of notes. Our experience of the note we're 
hearing now as part of a melody is only possible if we 
somehow retain the other notes we've heard and hear 
them all as part of a single tune. This holding in 
consciousness of past perceptions which co-constitute 
the present is called "retention." In turn, memory of 
the past is co-constituted by present perception in two 
ways: (1) memory, as distinguished from fantasy, in-
cludes an image of something which was perceived, i.e., 
something which was present to us; (2) remembering 
something is'an act in which we are presently engaged, 
when we are engaged in it. Although these ideas about 
the interweaving of the faces of time form the basis 
for Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the ambiguity of time, 
for Husserl, time is not ambiguous. He believes that 
the difference between past and present experience is 
clear and distinct. The only difference between an ob-
ject in closed consciousness appearing as past and ap-
pearing as future is its mode of appearing—a desk ap-
pearing as a perception and a desk appearing as a 
memory. 1 0 Merleau-Ponty would disagree, and would sug-
gest that Husserl cannot describe experience correctly 
if he accepts the primacy of the object as a basic 
form. Merleau-Ponty would suggest that an object actu-
ally goes through changes in its constitution, since 
one of the features of past experience is that it can 
be reinterpreted and reconstituted. Husserl does not 
take into account pathological cases such as phantom 
limb and anognosia in which past experience appears as 
present, yet appears neither in the form of memory nor 
of anticipated perception. 
Ill 
David Hume is an empiricist philosopher whose over-
all project in A Treatise of Human Nature Merleau-Ponty 
would reject as obviously based on a prejudice towards 
the objective world. Hume's overall project is to 
describe the way the atoms of experience combine to 
constitute human knowledge, emotions and society. 
These atoms are called impressions ("all our sensa-
tions, passions and emotions, as they make their first 
appearance in the soul") and ideas ("the faint images 
of these in thinking and reasoning"). 1 1 What these 
atoms specifically are is determined by the objects of 
sensation. A complex impression of a red cube is ana-
lyzed as a set of simple impressions of red, solidity 
and cubicity, for example. Hume then attempts to 
reconstruct perception as it is actually experienced 
from these simple impressions. Hume recognizes that he 
has difficulty choosing between two accounts of many of 
the subjects he treats. One account is that of the 
vulgar, who take at face value the fictions which are 
suggested by sense-experience. The other is the philo-
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sophical account based on the theory of impressions and 
ideas. Hume's distinction between these two types of 
accounts is reminiscent of/anticipatpry of Merleau-
Ponty' s distinction between the subjective experience 
of perception vs. objective data which relies more on 
scientific theory than it does on perception. In some 
of the topics he treats, Hume proposes a third explana-
tion which mediates between the two accounts. In the 
case of the self, Hume simply makes use of both 
accounts. His relative ranking of the two reveals 
deeper dimensions of his object-orientation. 
The carefully argued account of the concept of self 
or personal identity which Hume presents in Book I of A 
Treatise of Human Nature appears to be contradicted by 
his introduction of a radically different experience of 
the self in Book II. In Book I Hume claims that, "when 
I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I al-
ways stumble upon some particular perception or other 
. . . 1 , 1 1 Hume claims that he has no distinct impres-
sion of anything he can call himself apart from any 
particular perception, referring to the self as a 
"bundle of perceptions." 1* He explains how those per-
ceptions are organized so as to give an illusion or 
false idea of the self. What we call the "self" is in 
reality a system of distinct perceptions linked by 
cause and effect and memory. One thought or perception 
gives rise to another. Through memory we become aware 
of this chain of perceptions; through memory, new per-
ceptions come to resemble past ones. In Book II, Hume 
speaks as if we do have an impression of the self. 
This idea or impression of self is "always intimately 
present to us" and is the liveliest impression 
imaginable. 1* (In the Treatise, the livelier the im-
pression the more credible it is.) Hume uses this 
description of the self as the basis for his complex 
explanation of sympathy, which is the basis for all 
human relationships. 
Hume needs both of his intuitions about the self to 
make his philosophical account of human nature—from 
the intellect to the passions—consistent. That ambig-
uity about the nature of the self should be essential 
to a consistent philosophical picture demands our at-
tention, demands an account. Merleau-Ponty's descrip-
tion of the ambiguity of time suggests such an account, 
as follows: One self is historical, described by the 
chain of mental events of a person's life. The other 
self is an ahistorical, present experience of self. 
The two remain distinct, on Hume's model, because every 
atom of experience is discrete. He cannot and would 
not say that every present includes within itself a 
past or a future. He views time as an illusion created 
by the succession of impressions and ideas. Therefore, 
having a past and future is a characteristic of the 
self as a bundle of discrete perceptions. Having a 
present is a characteristic of a single discrete ex-
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perience of the self. Both kinds of experience are 
necessary to give vis a coherent experience of the self 
in time. 
Our experience of the self takes its place in a 
line of perceptions, none of which, says Hume, is a 
perception of the self. In becoming part of the 
historical self, the present experience of self loses 
its personal character, its presence, its fullness of 
experience. The self which Hume describes in Book II 
merits no word reconciling or acknowledging his devia-
tion from his doctrine in Book I. For some reason Hume 
considers the historical, total self more important 
than the full experience of the self he describes in 
Book II. Merleau-Ponty has explained that our present 
experience only makes sense if we apprehend it within 
the framework of our "past" or repressed existence. In 
Hume's scheme, the historical self described in Book I 
is the framework of personal experience—a succession 
of perceptions connected by causation and resemblance, 
both with the aid of memory. One or a few impressions 
of the self will not change this basic structure of 
personal experience; these impressions simply take 
their place in the scheme of experience. The isolated 
experiences of the self described in Book II are not 
enough to suggest an alternate structure for personal 
experience, and hence do not pose any serious challenge 
to Hume's account in Book I. 
Personal history is the essence of Hume's descrip-
tion of the self. The self is not a substance, but a 
history, a framework of which all present and future 
experience becomes a part. The essence of this his-
tory, the principle which unifies it, is causation. 
The relation of ideas called causation allows us to in-
fer that one experience or perception will follow 
another, because observation of past regularities sug-
gests it. In Hume's system, causation is at the root 
of all our scientific and commonsense reasonings about 
the world. Although all our perceptions are distinct, 
we are able to observe empirical regularities which 
lead us to infer that B always follows upon A, or that 
"A causes B." Hume borrows the idea that perceptions 
cause each other from his account of how we reason 
about the world and applies it to his account of the 
self. Since our propensity to infer that perceptions 
cause each other enables us to construct a coherent ex-
perience of the world across time, causation must be 
the essential link between perceptions which entitles 
us to a single, coherent experience of a personal 
history. 
Both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty would reject this 
reasoning, for it begins with the world of objects and 
constructs a subjective or personal experience on the 
terms of the objective world. Husserl would describe a 
closed, self-sufficient self without reference to the 
world of objects. Merleau-Ponty would insist that 
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knowledge about the objective world is not the proper 
starting point from which to describe our experience of 
the self. For Merleau-Ponty, the interaction of self 
or body with the world make both what they are. The 
world is apprehended through and as the activities we 
can perform upon it; at the same time the objects that 
are in the world inform us what actions we can perform. 
If we begin with the objective world, we will only con-
struct an epiphenomenal mirror of it, just as Hume's 
account of personal history does. 
IV 
Hume's account and even Husserl's account seem to 
be satisfying in a way that Merleau-Ponty's is not. 
Hume and Husserl, at least, tell us something about the 
foundations of some aspect of experience. Hume tells 
us that the structure of personal experience mirrors 
the structure of the world of objects. Husserl tells 
us that structures or essences generated within closed 
consciousness are mapped onto the world. Merleau-Ponty 
will not tell us whether the subjective or the objec-
tive face of experience provides the meaning for our 
experience of the self. Moreleau-Ponty tells us nei-
ther (a) the principle through which subjective experi-
ence becomes objective nor (b) the way experience of 
the self forms the basis for experience of the world. 
Instead, he offers (a) the fact that subjective and ob-
jective are irreducible faces of our experience and (b) 
a description of our experience of the self which we 
can use as an analogy to understand our experience of 
the world. What's more, his explanation of "the gene-
sis of the objective world" (as he describes his 
endeavor) 1* is based on the objective, which he is 
trying to explain, as well as on the subjective. 
Husserl's and Hume's explanations resemble those of 
theoretical physics. On such a model, an ultimate, un-
perceivable substratum--atomic particles--is postulated 
as the real cause of our experience of material things 
in the world. On such a model, reality has two levels: 
the perceived, everyday reality of tables and chairs 
and the conceptually distinct, more real unperceived 
substratum. The substratum is understood as more fun-
damental than the everyday reality in that we can make 
more accurate judgments about it. It is not contami-
nated or confused by the world of experience. The sub-
stratum is also understood as prior in time. As the 
structure that is reached through analysis (such as 
Husserl's phenomenological reduction or Hume's philo-
sophical viewpoint), the substratum appears as capable 
of existing on its own, before it takes the particular 
shape or content that everyday experience supplies. It 
seems, for example, as if atoms existed long before 
they combined to form the table we perceive; as if 
Husserl's closed consciousness can exist without ful-
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fillment in the external world; as if we can have a 
structural self that is intelligible without a percep-
tion of self, on Hume's view. 
But on Merleau-Ponty's view time is ambiguous: 
something which appears as past derives its life from 
the present. He would understand explanation on the 
model of time as ambiguous. The explanandum (the tiling 
that is explained) is analogous to the present; the ex-
planans (the explanation) is analogous to the past. 
The substratum does not have a life of its own. Its 
authority, flexibility and reformulatability as an ex-
planation are derived from its relationship with its 
perceived manifestation. An explanation which does not 
change in the face of new perceptions becomes less an 
explanation than a paradigm, in Kuhn's sense of a model 
structuring scientific inquiry, and in an extended 
sense of a principle that structures experience as a 
complex does. 1 6 Such an explanation oversteps its 
place as analogous to a repressed past experience and 
begins to dominate the present, just as the impersonal 
body of the phantom limb patient dominates his/her 
bodily experience. 
Thus Merleau-Ponty provides the only type of expla-
nation he considers appropriate: one which acknowl-
edges the interaction of present and past, perceived 
reality and postulated reality, subjectivity and 
objectivity. Although objective explanation, knowledge 
of a thing-in-itself, is the form of explanation used 
in the sciences, Merleau-Ponty criticizes its use in 
philosophical explanation. Experience of things as ob-
jects, of things capable of being-in-themselves, is 
only one face of our experience. Things-as-perceived 
is the other face which Merleau-Ponty stresses. 
Knowledge of objects presupposes a point in time at 
which such things are determinate, their files closed. 
But, says Merleau-Ponty, there is no such time, al-
though it is assumed in scientific explanation. The 
past is always subject to revision in the face of pre-
sent experience even as present experience depends on 
that past for its intelligibility. Things-in-
themselves are determined to be what they are through 
perceptual information, even as perception depends upon 
the existence of things-in-themselves if it is to be 
intelligible. 
Merleau-Ponty discovers this thesis in his investi-
gation of the experience of the self/body. Two other 
descriptions of the self have been contrasted with 
Merleau-Ponty's. Husserl attempts to reduce the two 
faces of experience into one, describing things-in-
themselves in terms of things-as-perceived. As a con-
sequence, he describes a self which can exist and can 
apprehend itself without any contact with an external 
world. Hume describes things-as-perceived in terms of 
things-in-themselves, resulting in the description of a 
self which is complete without a perception of the 
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self. Nevertheless, we do interact with the external 
world and we do have perceptions of our selves. For 
Merleau-Ponty, these are both facts about experience. 
He is not willing to label one necessary and the other 
accidental. Philosophers who do so label the faces of 
experience are acting under the influence of the preju-
dice of the objective world, which leads them to ap-
proach their descriptions of the self as a search for a 
single set of determinate characteristics. By provid-
ing the framework for a critique of Hume's and 
Husserl's positions on the self, Merleau-Ponty hints at 
and provides an example of an alternative form of ex-
planation which recognizes the indeterminateness of ob-
jects or the ambiguity of being-in-the-world. It re-
mains as a task for his interpreters to articulate that 
new form and to provide experimental examples of it in 
philosophy, science and social science. 
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